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[T]o be judicious is to be weak, and to
compare exactly is to be not elect.
Harold Bloom'
They do things better with logarithms.
Benjamin N. Cardozo2
I. INTRODUCTION
One finds posturings about logarithms3 at law by people who do
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. The author thanks Allison Brickley,
Sharon Jones, and Louise Van Dyck for help writing this Essay.
Cf ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984). Maclntyre's title equivocates
between 'after' read as 'post' and as 'in pursuit of', suggesting on the one hand that virtue is
pass6, and on the other that we should strive for it.
1. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE 19 (1973).
2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 1 (1928).
3. Cardozo continues: "met unwritten is my table of logarithms, the index of the power
to which a precedent must be raised to produce the formula of justice." Id. at 2. He is not
lamenting the methodological backwardness of law, but complacently celebrating its
complexity. See also PAUL FEYERABEND, THREE DIALOGUES ON KNOWLEDGE 5 (1991).
Cardozo wrote in 1928; shift to 1991:
When I first started teaching consumer protection a decade ago, the mathematics
of false advertising was simple. If a box or brochure said "100% cotton," you
merely took the item in question and subtracted it from the words: any difference
was the measure of your legal remedy. Sometimes you had to add in buyer's
expertise or multiply the whole by seller's bad faith, but generally the whole
reason people even took a class in consumer protection was that you didn't have
to learn logarithms.
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 36 (1991). The dates and
Williams' use of the past tense suggest legal logarithms once were esoteric but are okay or
inevitable now.
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not use them. The language 'logarithms' is metaphorical, denoting
any strange mathematics.
This Essay studies one great case, De Cicco v. Schweizer,5 using
noncooperative game theory6 and a neural network.7 The mathemat-
ics is sufficiently strange. The game and network serve different,
complementary ends:
Roth recently rashly claims: "Anyone who has ever taken a
basic contracts class knows that no common law court in history has
ever enforced a gratuitous promise." 9 Nor does the scholarly litera-
ture give a good reason to enforce, or indeed not to enforce, such a
promise."° Yet a noncooperative game supplies the reason in a class
of cases including De Cicco.
A traveller said of a representative cabin in the Texas hill coun-
try, it is "one through whose walls a cat could be hurled 'at ran-
dom. '' ' A net provides the equivalent of a cat test for the
substantiality of a legal argument, the cat surrogate being thrown
through De Cicco without meeting perceptible resistance.
II. KREPS' GAME
Informally, I first prove a little theorem that a threat cannot suc-
ceed, by which below, in Part V, I interpret De Cicco. Its conclusion
4. I won't use them either. For a representative use, for example to decide whether the
coast of Britain has finite length, see HEINZ-Orro PEITGEN ET AL., FRACTALS FOR THE
CLASSROOM: INTRODUCTION TO FRACTALS AND CHAOS 218-28 (1992). It doesn't.
5. 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). About Cinderella and the Count: they do not live happily
ever after. See infra text accompanying note 67.
6. The "defining characteristic of noncooperative game theory," which by incorporating
rule-governed behavior makes unmistakable the legal relevance of this theory, is its study of
"how cooperation (and many other forms of aggregate behavior) can emerge from self-
interested individual behavior within a given set of 'rules.'" DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 355 (1990).
7. Neural networks are "systems that are deliberately constructed to make use of some of
the organizational principles that are felt to be used in the human brain." James A. Anderson,
General Introduction, in NEUROCOMPUTING: FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH xii, xiii (James A.
Anderson & Edward Rosenfeld eds., 1988) (hereinafter: NEUROCOMPUTING).
8. .- The game turns on a Nash equilibrium being subgame imperfect. Avery Katz, The
Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation,
89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 235-41 (1990). The expression 'subgame (im)perfect' appears in a
single article in the LEXIS Lawrev Library.
2.-A pivotal feature of the net is that it can't even solve the XOR (exclusive or)
problem-can't learn that of two things, either alone is okay, neither or both bad. A search of
the LEXIS Lawrev Library for 'XOR' elicits "The following word does not exist ... "
9. Alan Roth, Note, He Thought He Was Right (But Wasn't): Property Law in Anthony
Trollope's The Eustace Diamonds, 44 STAN. L. REV. 879, 892 (1992).
10. See infra note 76.
11. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 18
(1983) (quoting Rutherford Hayes).
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is unintuitive largely because 'threat' in the statement of it deviates
from ordinary language. Let A threaten B: undertake to harm B
unless B does as A directs. Making good on the threat must harm A
as well as B (ordinary language does not make this demand). I
assume as well that A's preferences are transparent to B-an assump-
tion that, while sometimes unrealistic, befits my later application.
For example, my dean, Hugh Macgill the
First, prefers that I help entertain a guest of the rep' Ome
Connecticut Law School, but only if I am not
morose: the School comes off poorly then. I (2,2)
prefer solitude to good fellowship, but dislike init
to mope. If I must dine out, I like to make the
best of a bad deal. I tell Hugh: "If you invite Hh I
me, I will sulk." That is the threat. I hope to
forestall his inviting me. Hugh, however, init
knows my preferences and would not be dean
could he not manipulate me through them. He me
will invite me, and I will be companionable. \ ..,k
I call up a noncooperative game from
David Kreps' great graduate text1 2 to demon-
strate the theorem. In Figure 1, Hugh chooses (,1) (0)
at the empty node, I at the filled node. We
achieve the parenthetical payoffs, his listed first. By convention play
begins at the empty node, hence Hugh chooses first. Restated in this
idiom, my threat is to choose sulk. If in response he chooses
-invite, 1 3 we each get 2. The choices make a Nash equilibrium,4
because neither of us can change his choice to get greater utility uni-
laterally. Were Hugh to choose invite, he would have 0 instead of 2.
Were I to choose -sulk, I would still get 2, because, he not having
invited me, I neither sulk nor do not sulk. But -invite-sulk is not the
sole Nash equilibrium: invite--sulk is a Nash equilibrium too. If I
do not sulk Hugh gets 3, his highest payoff; if he invites me, by being
companionable I receive 1, not 0.
At -invite-sulk the threat succeeds; at invite- -sulk it fails. At
which Nash equilibrium do Hugh and I find repose? At invite- -sulk,
because it alone is subgame perfect. Imagine Hugh has chosen to
invite me. Now at the restaurant it is my turn to act. The choice
before me, at the filled node, is a subgame. A game is subgame perfect
if in each subgame each choosing player maximizes her utility. I
12. KREPS, supra note 6.
13. The tilde ('~') is 'not'.
14. See Katz, supra note 8, at 235-41.
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receive 1 by not sulking, 0 otherwise. Maximizing my utility, as we
all do always, I am pleasant. I choose -sulk, despite my threat. A
previous choice to sulk, made before I need act on it, I revoke.'"
Hypothetically, my preferences are transparent to Hugh, hence I can-
not deter him.16
15. One objects: pledging to retaliate may alter the circumstances so A prefers to carry out
her threat, one's word counting for something. Also if A anticipates repeated play, she may
prefer to retaliate at some immediate cost pour encourager les autres. Or A may become angry,
so that hurting B itself satisfies, offsetting other losses.
The best data here are generated outside contract law, in Hobbes' state of nature. Inquiry
might start at ELMORE LEONARD, GET SHORTY 62 (1990), wherein a character says, "[B]reak
his fuckin legs. That's the first thing they think of, come up with that statement. I say to 'em,
'How's he gonna pay you if he's in the hospital?' They don't think of that."
It would proceed to an FBI tape of Paul Castellano, perhaps Leonard's prototype, talking
with a capo:
"Look," said the Godfather, "when we sit down to clip a guy, we have to
remember what's at stake here. There's some hazard. Guys forget that. They
get a guy behind in his vig payments, they get a hard-on about it, right away they
wanna whack him. Why? Just because they're pissed off, they're aggravated.
But what I say is, 'Hey, you're making a living with this guy. He gets you
aggravated, and right away you wanna use the hammer? How do you get your
money then?'"
"It's means and ends," Joe Armone said softly. "The idea is to collect. But
you know, Paul, I think some guys just take so much pleasure from breaking
heads that they'd almost rather not get paid."
"Yeah, yeah," the Godfather agreed. "We got some guys like that. Dick-
fists, I call 'em. I'm always sayin' to 'em, 'Just to take a guy out, that ain't the
point.' Because I'll tell ya, Piney, anytime I can remember that we knocked guys
out, it cost us. It's like there's a tax on it or some shit. Somebody gets arrested.
Or there's a fuckup, which means we gotta clip another guy, maybe a guy we
don't wanna lose."
JOSEPH F. O'BRIEN & ANDRIs KURINS, Boss OF BOSSES: THE FALL OF THE GODFATHER
237-38 (1991). Armone, more loveable than most mafiosi, got the name 'Piney' by requiring
vendors of Christmas trees to donate small trees to the poor. Id. at 201. Or I guess he'd kill
them.
These possibilities do not qualify the game but change it by challenging the stipulated
payoffs to A. I am not talking about these other games.
16. Here is an instance of Kreps' game misplayed by Gauthier, a fine moral philosopher.
He proposes this hypothetical case:
B, a university professor in Boston, is offered a position in Dallas. His wife, A,
wishes to deter him from accepting the appointment and so tells him that, if he
accepts it, she will leave him and remain in Boston, even though she would prefer
to accompany him to Dallas. Then if A is indifferent between a lottery that
would offer a 70 percent chance that B would stay in Boston and a 30 percent
chance that he would go alone to Dallas, and the certainty that both would go to
Dallas, .7 is a minimum required probability for deterrent success. . . . A
supposes that there is a 50 percent chance that B will accept the appointment in
Dallas if she will accompany him, but only a 10 percent chance that he will
accept it if she won't ....
DAVID GAUTHIER, Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality, in MORAL DEALING: CON-
TRACT, ETHICS, AND REASON 298, 310 (1990).
One sees at once, as shown below, the game is congruent to that of Figure 1 above with
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III. CONTRACT LAW BEFORE DE Cicco
In 1916, New York law unequivocally held that bargained-for
-invite = Boston, invite = Dallas, sulk = stay, and -sulk = go. So B is choosing at node 1,
A at node 2.
stay o
Boston 1Dallas 2
B 
A go (,.7)
Gauthier's Game
Furthermore we can calculate A's (von Neumann-Morgenstern) cardinal utilities by setting A
and B staying in Boston = 1 and A staying and B going to Dallas = 0. See JOHN VON
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
15-30 (1953). Then A's utility if both go = .7(1) + .3(0) = .7, the sum of the utilities to A of
both staying and B going alone weighted by their probabilities in the lottery. Strictly speaking
we know nothing of B's utilities - only what A thinks about them; but we don't need to know.
Gauthier says: "A indeed maximizes her expected utility by her adoption of a deterrent
policy, requiring her to form the conditional intention not to accompany B should he accept an
appointment in Dallas." GAUTHIER, supra, at 310. To verify this conclusion inspect his
claim, quoted above, "A supposes that there is a 50 percent chance that B will accept the
appointment in Dallas if she will accompany him, but only a 10 percent chance that he will
accept it if she won't ...." Id. By it the probability is .5 that A will get what she wants, that
B stay in Boston, by his unilateral decision to do so. Hence, forget about that probability;
focus on the .5 probability she can affect by her not accompanying him. Doing nothing, she
there has utility .5(.7) = .35. Not accompanying him, she gets a lottery with utility .4(1) +
.1(0) = .4.
The trouble comes hard on the heels of this conclusion, with what Gauthier thinks his
game proves: that it is rational or even possible that A stay if her efforts to deter B's going fail.
I do want to insist that my argument refutes the claim that deterrence is neces-
sarily an irrational policy because carrying out the deterrent intention is not util-
ity maximizing. The argument for the irrationality of deterrence looks only to
the costs of deterrent failure. Because there are such costs, it rejects the policy.
My argument, on the other hand, relates the probability-weighted costs of deter-
rent failure to the probability-weighted benefits of deterrent success in order to
assess the rationality of forming the conditional, non-maximizing intention
which is the core of a deterrent policy. I claim that if it is rational to form this
conditional, deterrent intention, then, should deterrence fail and the condition be
realized, it is rational to act on it. With appropriate probability weighting, the
utility cost of acting on the deterrent intention enters into determining whether
it is rational to form the intention. Once this is decided, the cost of acting on the
intention does not enter again into determining whether, if deterrence fails, it is
rational to act on it. Acting on it is part of a deterrent policy, and if expected
utility is maximized by forming the conditional deterrent intention, then deter-
rence is a rational policy.
Id. at 311-12. From the perspective of Kreps' game, one realizes that Gauthier is wrong two
ways. B choosing Boston and A choosing stay is another subgame imperfect Nash equilibrium.
B will not be deterred. And A will go.
Compare tort law, intended optimally to deter. The standard of conduct that forms the
basis for a finding of negligence is usually determined by a risk-benefit analysis. Judge Learned
Hand reduced this formula to: "[T]he probability [may] be called P; the injury L; and the
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promises are enforceable unless the promisee is already bound to do
what she is bargaining about. The stuff after 'unless' is the preexisting
duty rule. This rule is supported by a string citation the court
reporter in De Cicco attributed to Bartlett, Wild, and Duvall, attor-
neys for the defendant. The citation begins, "Pollock on Cont. 161;
Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392; Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N. Y.
40; Kramer v. Kramer, 181 N. Y. 447; 2 Parsons on Cont. 437; Leake
on Cont. [6th ed.] 444; . . . ," and extends beyond one's patience.
The attorneys cite ordinary judge-made law. Their authorities are
cases and texts relying on cases.
Oversimply, there are two broad kinds of artificial intelligence:
expert systems and neural networks. Expert systems are relatively
frequent in law, neural networks scarce. Expert systems deduce by
using rules.' 8 Neural networks, as befits the common law, induce
from cases. 9 I will build a perceptron,20 the classic neural network,
burden B; liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B [is less
than] PL." United States v. Carrol Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), reh'g denied, 160
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947). Pretend, so there is no problem about duty, that A threatens B, not,
"If you go, I'll stay," but, "If you go, I'll kill you." If one just applies the Hand formula to
gauge the negligence of the threat, A may be faultless. The harm is B's being killed. Its
probability, as Gauthier would have it, is that of B's still deciding to go. The cost of preventing
the harm is A's not threatening, which by its loss in expected value to A may exceed the
product of the harm to B and its probability. But nobody would think of optimally deterring
A from threatening in lieu of optimally deterring her from carrying out the threat. A decides
nothing dangerous so early.
17. De Cicco, 221 N.Y. at 431. I shall later refer to this citation as the Bartlett citation. It
does not appear at 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917).
18. See generally ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
APPROACH TO LEGAL REASONING (1987) (building an expert system that answers
examination questions about offer and acceptance).
19. Cf. Ralph Barletta, An Introduction to Case-Based Reasoning, Al EXPERT, Aug. 1991,
at 42, which softens the dichotomy.
20. MARVIN MINSKY & SEYMOUR A. PAPERT, PERCEPTRONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTATIONAL GEOMETRY 12 (1988).
Several properties distinguish classical single-output Rosenblatt perceptrons. (1) They
have n input and one output processing elements (PEs), without a hidden layer between. (2)
Outputs are 0 or 1. (3) The output of the output PE is an increasing additive function of
weighted inputs from the input PEs, hence its output is 0 until the weighted sum exceeds 0,
then becomes 1 and stays that. (4) A perceptron learns by adjusting its weights using this
function: If its output is and should be I or if its output is and should be 0, change nothing.
Else, if its output is 0 and should be 1, increase the weights of its inputs that have value 1. Or
if its output is one and should be 0, decrease the weights of its inputs that have value 1.
NEURALWARE, INC., REFERENCE GUIDE 192 (1991).
I adjust one part of NeuralWare's perceptron program, see infra note 21. The program's
transfer function reports an actual sum if the sum exceeds 0, instead of converting it to 1. See
infra note 34. NeuralWare's step function gives this other result, truer to the classic
perceptron literature. See JOHN HERTZ ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NEURAL
COMPUTATION 94-97 (1991); H. D. Block, The Perceptron: A Model for Brain Functioning. I,
34 REV. MOD. PHYSICS 123 (1962), reprinted in NEUROCOMPUTING, supra note 7, at 138;
Frank Rosenblatt, The Perceptron: A Probabilistic Model for Information Storage and
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to model the New York law of preexisting duty preCardozo.
Figure 2 is the preCardozo percep-21 ~FIGURE2
tron.2' Its boxes are neurons or PEs Perceptron for Preexisting Duty
(processing elements). The lines exhibit
the connections between the PEs, which cftrt
conform to biological axons, synapses, output
and dendrites. Three PEs comprise the
bottom or input layer: a bias term,
always 1; a PE registering bargain; and
a PE registering duty. The large, Inputs
hatched boxes indicate outputs of 1; the bias bargan duty
small, black box indicates an output of
0. Each input PE is connected to the output PE. The perceptron
learns by changing the weights on these connections.
One easily teaches a perceptron preexisting duty by exposing it to
case law: all combinations of bargain or not and preexisting duty or
not, with their resolutions. Figure 3 states the cases for the percep-
tron in the binary language it understands. Each case is a row in that
figure. The cases are coded with 'l's and '0's. For example, a '1' in
the first column indicates a bargain; a '1' in the second column a duty;
and a '0' in that column no duty. Figure 3 instructs that only
instances of bargains without preexisting duties produce contracts.
Row 3 of Figure 3, which alone satisfies these conditions for con-
tract, is Hamer v. Sidway2 2 (among other cases). That fine, familiar
case, like De Cicco, was decided by the New York Court of Appeals.
The decedent, William E. Story, Sr., promised his fifteen-year-old
nephew, William E. Story, 2d, $5000 not to smoke, chew, drink,
swear, or play cards or billiards for money until he was twenty-one.23
The nephew probably did not promise. The court says he "assented
thereto,"' 24 likely meaning he said he knew an offer was being made.
But the nephew performed, and his assignee sued the uncle's execu-
tor.2' The Storys bargained (the entry in row 3, column 1 is '1') and
the nephew lacked a preexisting duty (the entry in row 3, column 2 is
'0'), the New York Court of Appeals decided. Hence, on the
Organization in the Brain, 65 PSYCHOL.REv. 386 (1958), reprinted in NEUROCOMPUTING,
supra note 7, at 92. So I use the step function.
21. In this part and elsewhere I use a Compaq 16 Mhz 386 running the perceptron
program of Neuralware, Inc.'s NeuralWorks Professional Il/Plus version 4.05.
22. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
23. Id. at 256.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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nephew's completing performance, the Storys had contracted (the
entry in row 3, column 3 is '1').
26 FIGURE 3Row might be Mills v. Wyman, in Cases for Preexisting Duty
which Mills nursed Wyman's son until he
died.27  Wyman promised to pay Mills' Inputs Output
costs,2 8 and the court would not compel this
payment.29 Mills had no duty; nor had he / e,
bargained for Wyman's promise. 0 0 0
Row 4 is any preexisting duty case cor- o 1 0
rectly cited by attorneys for the defendant, 1 0 1
Bartlett et al. I 1 0
Row 2 is most naturally a third-party
beneficiary case: a duty exists which the
plaintiff did not bargain to impose. Immediately a reader recalls Law-
rence v. Fox.3° Yet that case won't work here. Because Lawrence
recovered,3' its contract column is '1', and the perceptron cannot
learn it, as Part V explains. I substitute a case by Posner denying
liability: Truck Insurance Exchange v. Ashland Oil, Inc.32 That case
held a tort victim an incidental beneficiary of its tortfeasor's insurance
carrier;33 its contract column is '0'.
To train the perceptron on the cases of Figure 3, we display them
repeatedly. We put the facts 1 or 0 into the bargain and duty PEs.
The perceptron decides the cases. Then we tell the perceptron how it
should have decided. The perceptron compares its decisions to the
correct decisions, then adjusts its weights, moving gradually toward
right judgments.34
In Figure 2 and throughout, large, hatched boxes represent ls,
26. 3 Pick. 207 (Mass. 1825).
27. Id. at 227.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 212.
30. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In Lawrence, the court explained that
Holly . . . at the request of the defendant, loaned and advanced to him $300,
stating at the time that he owed that sum to the plaintiff for money borrowed of
him, and had agreed to pay it to him .... The defendant in consideration thereof
... promised to pay it .to the plaintiff ....
Id. at 269. See Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1985).
31. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 275.
32. 951 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff was not bound by settlement between excess
insurer and its insured where plaintiff was not party to suit).
33. Ashland Oil, 951 F.2d at 789.
34. Here, in some detail, is how the perceptron gets its output from its input. Each input
is assigned a weight. Initially the weights are assigned randomly. I draw them from a sample
uniformly distributed between -5 and 5. The perceptron multiplies each input, 1 or 0, by its
1992] A STUDY AFTER CARDOZO
small, black boxes Os. Hence the inputs shown for Figure 2 are the
facts of a case Bartlett et al.35 cited, from Row 4. The perceptron is
deciding the case correctly. The inputs besides the bias input are bar-
gain = 1 and preexisting duty = 1; the output is contract = 0.
IV. READING CARDOZO READING DE CICCO
36
I need not dwell on the circumstances and resolution of De Cicco,
as they belong to our common legal culture. The characters of the
case are Joseph Schweizer, the father, in the rag trade in New York;
Blanche, the daughter; the Count, with an Italian title but likely little
money, whom Blanche loves or covets; De Cicco, a stranger; and Car-
dozo, a judge. Think respectively of Walter Brennan, Vivian Leigh,
Marlon Brando, Fred MacMurray, and Spencer Tracy. Blanche and
the Count are engaged. Father promises the Count to pay Blanche
$2500 a year. That is in 1902. Blanche and the Count marry; a dec-
weight, then adds the products. If the sum exceeds 0, the perceptron gives output 1. If the
sum is 0 or less, it gives 0. The calculations were performed as indicated supra note 23.
For instance, let the initial weights be 0.3080 for the bias term; 1.0890 for the bargain
term; and 3.4438 for the duty term. Right now, the perceptron knows nothing, so is as likely
to get a wrong as a right result. We randomly show it a case, say row 4, which has the inputs
1, 1 (besides the bias input). It multiplies and adds, getting 4.8408. Hence it reports I-
'contract'-which is wrong.
Now it starts to learn, because it sees the right answer, too. It adds, if its answer is 0
instead of 1, or subtracts, if its answer is 1 instead of 0, a set amount from the weight of each
input that is 1. I have set this amount at 0.5. In our example the perceptron subtracts 0.5
from each of the three weights.
The weights are now -0.1920,0.5890, and 2.9438. We show it Hamer, 1, 0, which it gets
right, -0.1920 + 0.5890 = 0.3970 > 0. If it gets a case right, it leaves its weights alone and
proceeds to the next case. That is row 2, with inputs 0, 1, which it gets wrong. Although
-0.1920 + 2.9438 = 3.232 > 0, there is not a contract in this case. Hence it subtracts 0.5
from the bias and duty weights, leaving the bargain weight alone, because the input to that PE
was 0.
Training
PEs 1 2 3
bias -0.6920 -4.1153 -0.0062
bargain 1.0890 4.4830 0.4176
duty -1.0562 -0.7973 -3.5807
Presentation and tuition continue, inputs and outputs chosen randomly from the list of Figure
3, until the perceptron gets all four cases right, here at the thirty-seventh sample. The
concluding weights are -0.6920, 1.0890, and - 1.0562, as for training 1 of the figure above.
The duty weight changed most, from 3.4438 to - 1.0562. This is as it should be, because the
existence of a duty counts against there being a contract. Training the perceptron twice more
fills out the figure above. Its weights differ depending on the starting weights and the order in
which the cases are presented. For a detailed statement of the perceptron learning rule, see
Eduardo D. Sontag & Hector J. Sussmann, Back Propagation Separates Where Perceptrons Do,
4 NEURAL NETWORKS 243, 244 (1991).
35. See supra note 17.
36. Cf. READING DE MAN READING (Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich eds., 1989).
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ade later De Cicco, an assignee, sues Father on a year's worth of the
promise, which Cardozo enforces. 37
What are we to make of the great judge's opinion? The passage
that need concern us is:
The defendant knew that a man and a woman were assuming the
responsibilities of wedlock in the belief that adequate provision had
been made for the woman and for future offspring. He offered this
inducement to both while they were free to retract or to delay.
That they neither retracted nor delayed is certain. It is not to be
expected that they should lay bare all the motives and promptings,
some avowed and conscious, others perhaps half-conscious and
inarticulate, which swayed their conduct. It is enough that the
natural consequence of the defendant's promise was to induce
them to put the thought of rescission or delay aside. From that
moment, there was no longer a real alternative. There was no
longer what philosophers call a "living" option.... It will not do
to divert the minds of others from a given line of conduct, and then
to urge that because of the diversion the opportunity has gone by
to say how their minds would otherwise have acted. If the ten-
dency of the promise is to induce them to persevere, reliance and
detriment may be inferred from the mere fact of performance. The
springs of conduct are subtle and varied. One who meddles with
them must not insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the
spring which he released was effective to the exclusion of all
others.38
The form of the argument, FIGURE 4
"It is possible there were these Perceptron for Preexisting DutyAfter De Cicco
mental events, therefore . . . ,"
allows nearly any conclusion-
possible mental events, unlike Output
unicorns, being lavishly distrib-
uted. Empirically, this passage
is among Cardozo's silliest. As
Cardozo interpreted the record, Inputs
implausibly, Father bargained bim bagain duty joint
against the Count and Blanche,
a team, for the title 'Father of the Countess'.
Yet, the record in De Cicco contains nothing to indicate Blanche
and the Count ever contemplated rescission or delay.39 The case is a
37. De Cicco, 117 N.E. at 811.
38. Id. at 809-10.
39. See supra text accompanying note 38. The individual sentences of the passage elicit
these comments: 1. Contract law after Holmes ordinarily does not deal with beliefs (or other
mental entities). The preposition 'in' asks to be translated 'because of'. It does not make that
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confirming instance of what Judge Posner writing of Cardozo's opin-
ion in Palsgraf 10 describes as "Cardozo go[ing] beyond omissions,
even misleading ones, and mak[ing] up facts."'"
There is not an iota of evidence in the record that Father bar-
gained thus. Instead the transcript of the trial suggests he fled the
game of Part V, his purchase of the Count being part payment.
I turn to the law. Cardozo distinguished his case from all
others.42 He had to distinguish it because the preexisting duty rule,
entrenched in New York law,43 precluded, or would have seemed to
an ordinary" judge to preclude, one's finding a contract. And yet
Cardozo wanted to find one. Finding contracts was a propensity of
his, seen most starkly in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.45 For my
immediate purposes, de gustibus non est disputandum.
commitment and retreats to 'while having'. 2. Here 'offered' must be a term of ordinary
language, lest Cardozo commit a petitio. But it gets its force from its technical legal use.
Nothing in the record indicates the promise was made or received as an inducement, or made
both to Blanche and to the Count. 3. They did marry. So that is true at least. The record
neither discloses nor denies delays. 4. Fine, we do not know why they acted as they did. 5. To
put a thought aside, you first must entertain it. Nothing in the record supports a claim that
either Blanche or the Count contemplated rescission or delay. 6. & 7. These alone seem
straight out false, unless merely metaphysical. Neither 'real' nor 'living' may make an
empirical claim. I do not know the philosophers Cardozo had in mind. 8. Again, the record
does not reveal that any minds were diverted. Otherwise, Posner puts the point, not a bad one,
this way: "The proof of a counterfactual (what would have happened if... ) is often difficult,
and, within reason, doubts are resolved against the wrongdoer." Sunds Defibrator AB v.
Beloit Corp., 930 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 1991). But Cardozo stretched to assign wrongdoing.
9. The need for inducement is wholly hypothetical. The stance here is to accept as true what is
merely possible. 10. Sure. 11. Cardozo's rejection of "too nice a measure of proof" rings
hollow in a construct devoid of proof at all.
40. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
41. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 43 (1990).
42. See DeCicco, 117 N.E. at 808-09.
43. See id. at 808. Cardozo notes in passing that "[t]he Courts of this state are committed
to the view that a promise by A. to B. to induce him not to break his contract with C. is void."
Id.
44. "It is strange to talk of Hercules when your starting point is Harry Blackmun." JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 174 (1976). Cardozo is Hercules near
enough.
45. 118 N.E. 214 (1918) ("A promise may be lacking and yet the whole writing may be
'instinct with obligation'...." Id. at 214.).
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Here is Cardozo's distinction: if a IGURE 5
True Data Setpromise runs jointly to parties bound by a for Preexisting Duty
contract between them to do what the Input Output
promisor is bargaining for, their not
rescinding their contract, as they might
do, is consideration for the promise.46 0 0 0 0
Cardozo decided, and the passage we
are investigating presupposes, that 0 1 0 0
Father's promise, although in form 1 0 0 1
directed to the Count only, ran also to I 1 o o
Blanche. Or the passage I quote implicitly I 1 I I
argues for this proposition. It is difficult
to describe duplicity in the language of
ordinary scholarship.
Let me relate the legal rule to the
computations of Part III. Cardozo is telling us, in terms of percep-
trons, that Figure 2 misspecifies the network. The true perceptron,
that of Figure 4, has a fourth input PE, in addition to bias, bargain,
and duty PEs. This fourth PE is sensitive to the promise running
jointly to parties who have contracted, as Cardozo says the promise
does in De Cicco.
The true data then are those of Figure 5. The first difference
from the data of Figure 3, upon which contract law appeared to be
built before Cardozo, is that the new data include a column, labelled
'joint', supplying the new input. The entry in that column is '1' if a
promise runs jointly to parties bound and '0' if not. For the first four
rows, which correspond to those of Figure 3, this input is '0', signify-
ing that in the Bartlett citation47 promises did not run to contracting
parties jointly. The second difference between the two figures is that
the fifth row of Figure 5 - 1, 1, 1, 1 - is new. Of all the cases that
had come before the Court of Appeals only De Cicco goes in that row.
Because he faced a case of first impression, Cardozo could freely
select '1' or '0' in the contract column of the fifth row of Figure 5; he
chose '1'. The subterfuge of adding a variable to ratify a result suc-
ceeds everywhere except in quantum mechanics.41 One imagines Car-
dozo in the enriched context speaking thus: "The trouble is that the
correct perceptron, from Figure 4, was trained on the wrong data:
46. See De Cicco, 117 N.E. at 808-09.
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. See generally JOHN S. BELL, SPEAKABLE AND UNSPEAKABLE IN QUANTUM
MECHANICS (1987).
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those of the first four rows only of Figure 5. It should have been
trained, and should now be trained, on all rows."
For rows 1 through 4 of Figure 5, the input for joint is uniformly
0. Hence the PE recognizing jointness is redundant. A suitable pro-
gram designed to prune a network would remove it.4 9 A perceptron
trained on the first four rows of Figure 5, without De Cicco, may
decide that case either way. Initially, the weight for the input joint is
randomly assigned. Training does not alter it because its multipli-
cand, the input itself, is always 0. Figure 4 above shows the percep-
tron deciding De Cicco correctly.50
Anne Gardner's influential book advocating legal expert systems,
which are rivals of neural networks in artificial intelligence, says that
ideally,
an Al program would be able to be told about new sources-newly
decided cases, for instance, or old cases not included in the initial
knowledge base-and to fit these cases into its existing rule struc-
ture, perhaps forcibly. The decisions, used as annotations to the
rules, could begin to change the rules' status and their meaning.51
The perceptron is acting out Gardner's ideal scenario with these
correspondences:
cases -+ rows of Figure 5
newly decided case -+ row 5
rules --* connection weights.
49. See Jocelyn Sietsma & Robert J.F. Dow, Creating Artificial Neural Networks That
Generalize, 4 NEURAL NETWORKS 67, 70 (1991) (telling how to remove superfluous PEs,
superfluous usually because their weights after training approach 0).
50. The first column of the following table shows weights that decide the case as Cardozo
did. The second column shows weights that decide the case differently. That is, -0.0206 +
0.4533 + (-0.9986) + 4.9682 = 4.4023 > 0, while -0.2324 + 0.5998 + (-4.5750) +
(-3.4445) = -7.6521 < 0. These calculations use the weights 4.9682 and -3.4445 at joint.
Training
before & before after after
after De Cicco De Cicco De Cicco
De Cicco (joint (all vary)
varies)
bias -0.0206 -0.2324 -0.2324 -0.7324
bargain 0.4533 0.5998 0.5998 2.5998
duty -0.9986 -4.5750 -4.5750 -2.5750
joint 4.9682 -3.4445 4.5555 1.0555
The weights of column 1 can be left alone, the perceptron requiring no further training. The
perceptron with the weights displayed in column 2 must be retrained. We can retrain it by
holding all but the joint weight constant, as in column 3. That weight then changes from
-3.4445 to 4.5555. Or all the weights may be let change, producing 1.0555. Either way, the
perceptron learns De Cicco: -0.2324 + 0.5998 + (-4.5750) + 4.5555 = 0.3479 > 0, and
-0.7324 + 2.5998 + (-2.5750) + 1.0555 = 0.3479 > 0.
51. VON DER LIETH GARDNER, supra note 18, at 30.
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One may say a perceptron, unlike an expert system, induces its
own rules. To speak thus is unperspicuous, we will see at once. As
Gardner wants, a perceptron accommodates new cases by modifying
these rules. Moreover, a perceptron exceeds Gardner's fondest
imaginings. Gardner announces things like "each opinion can be
viewed as using a subset of precisely the rules that are stored in the
knowledge base." 2 She reifies rules and subordinates cases to them.
That is not the perceptron's way. For a perceptron, the cases are real,
the rules epiphenomenal. To seek rules in a perceptron is like search-
ing a person for a soul. Rules are theoretical entities one posits to
explain perceptron behavior."
V. UNDERSTANDING DE Cicco
Here is the flat state of the art in reading De Cicco:
The defendant in De Cicco v. Schweizer plainly lived to regret his
promise of annuity to his daughter Blanche. The suit on the prom-
ise was brought by an assignee-suggesting, perhaps, that
Blanche's marriage to Count Oberto has turned out no better than
we expected. Yet however severe the father's regrets at this stage,
and however reluctantly we require him to continue the annual
payments to a faceless speculator, the case offers one of the easiest
illustrations of the proposition that the enforceability of gratuitous
promises must be regarded as a benefit, not a detriment, to those
persons who make them. If Joseph Schweizer had not been able to
make a legally binding promise to his daughter, he would at best
have had to incur significant additional expense to achieve the
same result in another way, such as by creating a trust to make the
payments. The alternative, in all likelihood, was to give up the
chance to see Blanche married to the Count. At a minimum, the
ability to make an enforceable promise allowed Schweizer to
achieve his ends at lower cost; and it may well have afforded the
only means of achieving them.54
But the law is not so bland; starting from zero. The forthright
interpretation of the facts of De Cicco is that Blanche, pointing to the
Count, said, "Daddy, buy me that," and he did." By this reading, the
engagement is peripheral, and the preexisting duty rule ought not
52. Id. at 49.
53. Or our judges' or our own behavior.
54. Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 62 (1992)
(footnotes omitted); see infra note 76.
55. Father got what Blanche wanted at the low end of a reasonable price in 1902 dollars.
"Going prices" for adoption or brief marriage conferring title are "from $100,000 for a
common count, to $1 million for a proper prince." Philip Revzin, Want to Be Called Prince or
Countess? Here Is the Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1989, at Al.
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interfere with the purchase. Yet the reading is anachronistic; we feel
less insistently today than in 1902 the contractual weight of an
engagement-now the woman gets and keeps a ring.56 Decided thus,
as just a routine case of bargained-for exchange, De Cicco wants
greatness.
Cardozo decided he would speak interestingly rather than
truly. There is something to be said for this stance, and I will say it,
keeping in mind the constraint that a judge ought not decide a case
that is too hypothetical. The reason the judicial system is subsidized,
putting the best face on things, is that a judge not only settles disputes
between parties to a case, but builds law that will guide subsequent
parties and courts similarly situated. The claim presumes positive
externalities from adjudication. The size of these externalities
depends on what kind of case the judge is deciding. De Cicco gener-
ates more externalities as a family romance than as an installment
sale. Nor does contemplating the case as enforcement of a simple
marriage settlement, as is often done, stir the blood. The finding of a
family romance coheres with the forthright reading that the engage-
ment matters not a whit. By this reading though not Blanche but the
Count is superfluous. Father and Blanche have the big relation. The
Count is John Ireland in the fight between John Wayne and Mont-
gomery Clift in Red River.
Hence I must address the father-daughter relation. The record
in De Cicco, which Cardozo respects little, helps here. Of course, the
precedent to start with is King Lear, illustrating poor estate planning.
Father, unlike Old Lear,5 prudently didn't relinquish all assets at
once. But why give anything to Blanche ever? For love, defined with
an economist's close calculation of profit and loss. A and B love each
other if they "have interdependent utility functions. ' ' 59 In De Cicco
the dependence is only Father's utility on Blanche's because nothing
in the record indicates Blanche cares a fig for Father.
By way of illustration,w° pretend I have a friend, call her Clytem-
nestra. She buys a washer and dryer combination from Sears. The
bank dishonors her check for insufficient funds. Clytemnestra knew
the bank would do that. As a fugitive, she telephones me, asking,
"Pay Sears lest I go to jail." I love Clytemnestra, so I have a big
opportunity. At a price of $500, I can vastly increase her happiness,
56. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 203
(1990).
57. See supra text accompanying note 41.
58. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 1, sc. 1.
59. MARSHALL JEVONS, MURDER AT THE MARGIN 54 (1978).
60. Only partly true.
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hence somewhat increase my own happiness. The size of my gain
depends on the strength of my love. Because the opportunity cost of
$500 is less than my expected gain, I pay, thus releasing Clytemnestra
to shop again. It is her good luck that my preferences run this way.
She is maximizing her utility by incurring the optimal (for her)
amount of trouble: Less trouble and she could extract less money
from me, I lacking the opportunity to make her so happy. More
trouble costs her more than it is worth. The game ends when the
bank dishonors her check for $50,000, given as down payment on a
farm. I decline to pay, preferring to buy, say, a SUN 3/160C.6
The trial court awarded De Cicco eighty-four dollars.62 That is
distant from the $2500 he sought. The trial court thought Father
proved that he had piecemeal advanced Blanche $2416. Inspect the
record. Typically, Father testified, "Q. You mean to tell us that you
just handed her the $80? A. I just handed her the $80, ' ' 63 and "Q.
Did you send her the pearls? A. I sent her the pearls." Tediously,
65
he said much more. "A. The Countess came to New York alone; she
had no money, and she wanted some," Father described. "I gave it to
her, and she told me to advance some money on account of her allow-
ance. I told her there was nothing due on her allowance, that I paid
her allowance; she said, Well, take it off from the allowance that
comes due next year."'66 Again, "A .... She wanted to separate from
her husband, and she asked me for the money," to which plaintiff
successfully objected: "Mr. Schneiderman: I object to that, and ask
that it be stricken out, and ask your Honor to instruct the jury to
refrain from considering it. The Court: Yes, strike it out."' 67 All this,
abstracting from nobility and the difference between pearls and
washer-dryers, is just Clytemnestra telephoning me about Sears.
Let us return to the game at hand. Figure 6 states the game
abstractly, prior to Father's promising the Count. Blanche chooses
-spend or spend at the unfilled node. By -spend, I mean that she
frugally apportions her disbursements over time, so when she comes
61. See Assar Lindbeck & J6rgen W. Weibull, Altruism and Time Consistency: The
Economics ofFait Accompli, 96 J. POL. ECON. 1165 (1988) (explaining how the presence of
overlapping concerns between economic agents may lead to socially inefficient outcomes).
62. Record at 1.
63. Record at 37.
64. Record at 48.
65. The record is enlivened only by a witness, expert in Italian, sounding presciently like
Stanley Fish talking about textual communities. See Record at 22-26; STANLEY FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN
LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
66. Record at 49.
67. Id.
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to New York alone, she is not destitute. By spend, I mean that she
promptly dispenses the money Father gives her, and pleads to him
poverty and distress, intending to extract new money.
The unintuitive aspect of
this game, the part that is Family Game
hard to keep in focus, is
Father always chooses condi- r gve (010)
tionally and twice: once give Fathe
or -give if Blanche chooses 0
spend, a second time give or spend
-give if Blanche chooses Blanche give (-2,-)
-spend. That is why there 0
are two filled nodes in Figure
6. I state parenthetically the Father pvc (1.1)
possible payoffs, Blanche's -- ,end
first. The numerals read
ordinally tell only how -- iv (-I,2)
Blanche and Father rank the
payoffs. For instance
Blanche likes spend- -give ...
least, because she gets -2. Father likes -spend- .... give best,
because he gets 2.
So, we think, Blanche, like Clytemnestra, will spend, while
Father, as I did, will give at his top node, with baseline payoffs 0 for
each. Father is better off, if Blanche chooses spend, to give, receiving
0 instead of - 1. So of course is Blanche better off, 0 to - 2. The pair
of payoffs (0,0) is Pareto superior 68 to (-2,- 1), obtained if Father
fails to give at the top node. More completely, spend-give- -give, stat-
ing Father's choices top first, is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.69
That is, Blanche is better off spending if otherwise Father will not give
than not spending. What Father chooses at his bottom node does not
affect his payoff, given Blanche chooses to spend, because the play
proceeds through the top node.
But both outcomes with Blanche choosing -spend are Pareto
optimal. Elsewhere someone is worse off. Especially, (1, 1) dominates
(0,0). Blanche and Father's problem is how to get to (1,1). But first
consider why the payoffs are 1 each if Blanche does not spend yet
Father gives.
We return to Clytemnestra, who often wasted her mornings elud-
68. A state of the world is Pareto superior to another state if in the former someone is
better off and no one worse off. It is Pareto optimal if no state is Pareto superior to it.
69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ing the police. The sheriff's deputies would warn me when a warrant
was out. She could flee the county, awaiting my reparations. It
would go better for her if she could get the cash without this incon-
venience. Better for me too, because my happiness depended partly
on hers. Blanche's situation is similar: she would prefer to reach New
York rich. And Father, who loves her, would prefer that she arrive
rich.
That Blanche or Clytemnestra not spend and that concomitantly
we give is neither Father's first choice nor mine. In this regard the
new game replays Kreps' game. Better for me that Clytemnestra buy
nothing, that she avoid Sears. So I threaten her: "I shall not pay."
My threat of course as we saw fails.7" Comparably Father states his
choices -give and -give at the two filled nodes, hoping then Blanche
will choose -spend, getting -I instead of -2 if she spent. Their
choices, with payoffs (-1,2), are Pareto optimal, because elsewhere
Father does worse. And the choices are a Nash equilibrium. As we
have just seen, Blanche by spending benefits less, assuming Father
will not give in any case. Remember, Father has chosen -give at
both filled nodes. Assuming Blanche does not spend, his decision at
the top filled node doesn't affect his payoff because the play now
passes through the bottom node. Father's utility from not giving at
the bottom node surpasses that from his giving there 2 to 1.
Yet we know Blanche will spend nevertheless. Her spending
positions Father at his top node, where his resolution not to give fal-
ters, because by giving he receives 0, not -1. This is the old Schelling
game of whoever can commit herself first wins.7" The choices
-spend- -give- -give are a Nash equilibrium. They are not subgame
perfect, however, because they require that Father choose against his
interest. We know that (1,1) dominates (0,0): Blanche and Father
both have more utility there than at the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium. That's the rub. So Father promises Blanche, "Don't spend,
I'll give anyway." Imagine-counterfactually it will turn out-that
Blanche does not spend. Then Father is choosing at the bottom filled
node of Figure 6, and, maximizing his satisfaction, chooses -give.
This is straight Hobbes not Schelling: "[H]e which performeth first,
doth but betray himself to his enemy .. ."I' Blanche, no slouch she,
can predict this choice, hence spends despite Father's promise. So
Blanche and Father, unaided, are stalled at the Pareto inferior (0,0).
Enter the law, Hercules, to get De Cicco almost right. Cardozo
70. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
71. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
72. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1960).
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enforces Father's promise give at the bottom filled node. Blanche then
can safely choose -spend. The parties achieve a Pareto optimum. It
is not a Nash equilibrium. So what: it is Pareto superior to the one
that is subgame perfect.
Simply enforcing donative promises may trump two other efforts
toward this optimal result. In a delicate familial context, the bargain-
ing that provides consideration is tacit and unlikely to be uncovered
by a court. Likewise, although Blanche might have relied on Father's
promise, reliance on a gratuitous promise in every case I know about
consists of spending-Johnny buys a car and so forth 73 -not of
refraining from spending as required here.
Still, Cardozo should have ruled for Father. In the end he erred.
The true rule is: enforce the promise unless the promisee assigns it.
And Blanche and the Count assigned Father's promise to De Cicco.74
Enforcement of an assigned promise puts the parties back at the
Pareto inferior (0,0) as follows. Blanche, by assigning, has spent in
this wise. Father promised to pay her $2500 a year.75 If she can sell
the annuity, she can exhaust the proceeds and come again to him for
money, pleading her endemic distress. Thus Father lacks incentive to
promise in the first place. The court's enforcement of an assigned
promise cancels the advantage that enforcing the promise unassigned
achieves.76
73. See Appendix, 4 A.L.I. Proc. 98-103 (1926) (discussing possible outcomes where the
promisee, here Johnny, spends less than the promisor promised).
74. De Cicco, 117 N.E. at 808.
75. Id.
76. The literature otherwise shows not much reason either to enforce or not to enforce
gratuitous (donative) promises.
1. Reasons Against Enforcement. First, because our legal system is subsidized, parties
arguably litigate too much. To restrict legal redress other than by price, contract law, the
reasoning goes, should refuse to enforce small donative promises, whose costs of enforcement
exceed the attendant social gain. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics
and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 412-13 (1977). Second, a donative promise is more likely to
be imprudently made than a bargained-for promise. Yet a donative promise's formality signals
prudence. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979).
Then contract law might profitably enforce big, attentively expressed donative promises.
2. Reasonsfor Enforcement. The literature makes out only a weak case for enforcement of
donative promises. That case is on two levels. At the first level, letting an agent do what she
wants, in this instance bind herself, increases social wealth. An informed agent contracts only
if that lets her be better off. It is likely, and in any case can be assured by complementary legal
rules, that her behavior creates no external diseconomy. Hence, by making herself better off,
she pro tanto makes the world better off. The language here is that of Pareto superiority. At
the second level, a promisor needs a reason to prefer to contract. The cost of a donative
promise to the promisor is the utility of the discounted amount promised. Her benefit is the
promise's expected value to the promisee-the utility of the sum promised multiplied by the
subjective probability on the part of the promisee that the promisor will perform. Posner,
supra, at 412-13. Law standing ready to enforce the promise increases that probability by
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VI. CAT TEST
I invert the misogynist Samuelson's Razor, "All economic regu-
larities that have no common-sense core that you can explain to your
wife will soon fail," 7 7 to get the cat test 78 for insubstantiality of a legal
theory. That is, "Any principle you can explain to your perceptron is
not profound." A perceptron cannot handle variables that interact
nonlinearly, in the sense it can computey = ax + b but not, say, y -
x 2 + c. A theory is uninteresting unless its variables interact.
My target is the likes of Farnsworth and Young. They compli-
ment Cardozo's "dazzling ingenuity" in De Cicco and call the case "A
Judicial Tour De Force."' 79 It is nothing of the kind. Cardozo has
"depth as a brook is deep when one cannot see the bottom."
80
Consider the career of the perceptron. Rosenblatt's 1958 paper
8
'
inventing this net "created a sensation. "82
In the popular history of neural networks, first came the class-
ical period of the perceptron, when it seemed as if neural networks
could do anything. A hundred algorithms bloomed, a hundred
schools of learning machines contended. Then came the onset of
the dark ages, where, suddenly research on neural networks was
unloved, unwanted, and, most importantly, unfunded.
3
communicating to the promisee the promisor's intention to keep it - or at least the promisee
thinks she will get the money whatever the promisor intends. Hence the promisor may retain
the same benefit while reducing the amount she promises, thereby lessening her cost. Her gain
is straight social gain because she eliminates rather than shifts the cost. This is the tree Kull is
barking up in Kull, supra note 54, at 62.
The analysis is dubious because if the promisor does pay, the promisee later gets more
utility than she now expects. Or conversely, pretend the promisor never intends to pay.
Without contract law her cost is nothing but transaction costs, while with contract law it is
again the sum promised. The expected value to the promisee does not fall as far as the
expected cost to the promisor, because the promisor knows she will not pay, although the
promisee may only doubt she will pay.
3. Further Reading. For a good, inconclusive study of gratuitous promises, see Steven
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991).
77. Paul A. Samuelson, Problems of Methodology: Discussion, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 231,
235 (1963). The date explains 'wife'. No woman has won a Nobel Prize in Economics. Joan
Robinson lost out on politics not gender. Milton Friedman, Milton Friedman, in LIVES OF
THE LAUREATES: SEVEN NOBEL ECONOMISTS 77, 77 (William Breit & Roger W. Spencer
eds., 1986).
78. See supra text accompanying note 11.
79. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 329 (4th ed. 1988).
80. 1 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 89 (E.S. Haldane trans., 1963).
81. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
82. Introduction to Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
83. James A. Anderson & Edward Rosenfeld, Introduction to MARVIN MINSKY AND
SEYMOUR PAPERT, PERCEPTRONS (1962), reprinted in NEUROCOMPUTING, supra note 7, at
157.
A STUDY AFTER CARDOZO
The book Perceptrons8 4 likely
caused AI to abandon this technol-
ogy; at least it focused disaffection.
Rosenblatt may have done the hon-
orable thing.85 What matters for us
is the source of shortcoming. Nota-
bly the book "concluded that since a
perceptron could not perform an
exclusive OR operation, it was so
limited as to be uninteresting. 's6
The exclusive OR operation (XOR)
ascertains whether one or the other
FtGuRE 7
Linear Separability of Preexisting Duty
(0,I0=O 0
(0,0),00 bargain
(i,0) n I
of two conditions is satisfied,
although not both. For example, John W. Davis is said to have
argued before the Supreme Court in successive weeks on alternate
sides of a single issue.
Justice X: Weren't you here only last week asserting exactly the
opposite proposition?
Davis: Yes, your Honor.
Justice X: What have you to say for yourself?
Davis: I just hope I don't lose both cases.
Davis was appealing to XOR.17
84. MINSKY & PAPERT, supra note 20, at 12.
85. "Perceptrons (1969) effectively killed research on perceptrons. Rosenblatt died in a
solitary boating accident that may have been a suicide." HEINZ R. PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF
REASON: THE COMPUTER AND THE RISE OF THE SCIENCES OF COMPLEXITY 122 (1988).
86. NEURALWARE, INC., NEURAL COMPUTING 274 (1991).
87. Or so the story goes. I can't find it in WILLIAM HENRY HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S
LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973). The 45 'Davis' references in the LEXIS
Lawrev Library either speak unenthusiastically of his representing South Carolina in a
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), or quote his noble and
self-serving statement that having J. P. Morgan as a client did not corrupt him.
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Perceptrons fail at XOR because the
problem is not linearly separable. XOR CrimraXOR
would be linearly separable if one could draw
a straight line"8 that divides the cases decided Inputs Output
differently. A common index of the difficulty
of a problem is the degree to which it lacks 0- # /
linear separability. 9  By this index, percep- 0 0 0
trons solve only easy problems. 0 1 !
Figure 7 shows the linear separability of 1 0 1
the preCardozo preexisting duty rule. Plot 1 1 0
bargain and duty on the x and y axes. At
(1,1) there are both, at (0,0) neither. The fil-
led circle shows contract, the empty circles no
contract. The perceptron implicitly represents the preexisting duty
rule by a line like duty = bargain - 0.5 in Figure 7. This line sepa-
rates (1,0) contract from the other cases of no contract. The preexist-
ing duty rule is an AND problem-two conditions met at once -
that perceptrons succeed at.
88. Or more generally a hyperplane. See Sontag & Sussmann, supra note 34, at 244.
89. See P. Gallinari et al., On the Relations Between Discriminant Analysis and Multilayer
Perceptrons, 4 NEURAL NETWORKS 349, 352-53 (1991) (presenting a set of experiments on
problems with increasing degrees of nonlinearity). Of course the predicate 'easy' has a big
intuitive component here. What is easy to Feynman may be hard for Fido and vice versa.
A few technical remarks:
1. "The parity problem (or XOR, its N = 2 version) is often used for testing or evaluating
network designs. It should be realized, however, that it is a very hard problem .... HERTZ,
supra note 20, at 131.
2. The measure of linear separability is the largest eigen value of the matrix that is the
outer product of the total dispersion matrix and the dispersion matrix between classes. A value
0.0 is total inseparability; 1.0, complete separability. The linear separability of XOR (parity) is
0.002. Gallinari, supra, at 352-53.
3. The minimum distance of a case from the plane perpendicular to the weight vector of
the optimal perceptron for a problem measures how hard this problem is for perceptrons. A
negative distance indicates no perceptron can solve it. In Figure 7, this measure speaks to the
breadth of the channel between 0,0 and 1,1, on one hand, and 1,0 on the other. The difficulty
for AND is /17, for XOR, - 1/ 43. HERTZ, supra note 20, at 99-100.
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I give three examples of cases FiouR 9Linear Nonseparability of Assault
perceptrons cannot reconcile by and Fornication
reason of the "ever present"'
XOR problem. 91
1. Illusory Promise. If a '
party stands mute, she does not (01 ) 0
contract, absent a few exceptions (1,1) = 0
like prior dealings. If a party says,
"I promise x," or says, "I promise (0,0) = 0
not-x," she contracts, presuppos- (1,0) = 1
ing consideration to support the
promise. If she says "I promise x
or not-x," again she does not contract.
2 Rape. An anomaly in the law of rape for a long time was its
exonerating a rapist if his victim conceived, because conception
implied consent. 92 But earlier, before Gratian's rule, AD 375-383,
there was little rape law at all. Canon law "did not study, comment
on, or codify simple rape."93 Then assault (0,1 in Figure 8), and for-
nication (1,0) were offenses. Failing to assault or fornicate (0,0) was
by default licit. Simultaneously assaulting and fornicating (1,1) was
too. "Why these two notions [assault and fornication] were not
brought together before the time of Gratian would be worthy of fur-
ther study." 94 Plot sex and violence along the axes of Figure 9, whose
filled circles show culpability and empty circles, legal innocence. So
at (0,1), nonviolent sex, the accused is culpable; at (0,0), inaction, he
is innocent.
3. Third-Party Beneficiary. Return to Figure 3 representing con-
tract law preCardozo. I said Lawrence v. Fox95 would not fit in Row
2.96 Were we to put it there, in place of Posner's cases,97 we would
replace 0, 1, 0 with 0, 1, 1 and get the matrix of Figure 8. This is an
XOR a perceptron can't resolve: deji vu all over again.9 Geometri-
90. John Gambale & Dave Holden, Appeals to Many Users: Neural Works Professional III
Plus, AI EXPERT, July 1991, at 51, 53.
91. See HERTZ, supra note 20, at 94-97 (discussing linear separability); NEURALWARE,
INC., supra note 86, at 278-79.
92. Joan v. E., 5 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, 1 THE EYRE OF KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD II
111 (Selden Soc'y vol. 24, Frederic W. Maitland & William C. Bolland eds., 1909).
93. KATHRYN GRAVDAL, RAVISHING MAIDENS: WRITING RAPE IN MEDIEVAL
FRENCH LITERATURE AND LAW 10 (1991).
94. PIERRE PAYER, SEX AND THE PENITENTIALS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SEXUAL
CODE, 550-1150, at 117 (1984).
95. 20 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1859).
96. See supra p. 128.
97. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
98. Yogi Berra.
19921
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:121
cally, the cases would fit Figure 9, not Figure 7.
The poverty of perceptron thinking in hand, reflect on Cardozo's
strategy to decide De Cicco. 1. Find a fact in De Cicco but not in the
Bartlett citation.99 Cardozo found Father's promise running to the
mutually bound parties jointly. He did not so much find this fact as
create it."°° This was unnecessary because there will always be such a
fact--else De Cicco is res judicata. 2. Let the case turn on this
revealed or invented fact. 3. Decide the case as you desire. The cat
test disqualifies 1-3 as not profound.10 1
In perceptron terms, Cardozo need only pick a big positive
weight, perhaps 25, for joint in Figure 5. A perceptron trained on the
preexisting duty cases before De Cicco, that is, on the first four rows of
Figure 5 only, then finds contract = 1. Conversely picking a big neg-
ative weight forces a decision contract = 0.102
99. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
101. Still, the cat test is no panacea.
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition
in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the
practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy,
or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact
quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical
conclusions.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). The point
recast to my context is you can always add a new variable, but it makes a difference, which a
perceptron can't pick up, why you added it. Cardozo adds the variable just to get the result.
He has no functional reason, and gives none, to separate joint rescission (De Cicco read tenden-
tiously) from unilaterally abstaining from seeking rescission (Vanderbilt etc.) as sources of
consideration.
The cat test is to some extent a creature of form. To see this, consolidate the cases of
Figure 9 by adding a variable with value 0 for rows 1 and 4 and with value 1 for rows 2 and 3
of Figure 8. A perceptron can learn this distinction. We get a reduction, though, since a new
column for the variable would be just the output column of Figure 8. All XOR (everything) is
lost by this consolidation. Now, focus on the highly interactive game of Part V, opaque to the
perceptron. A similar loss results from a perceptron-friendly version of it.
102. The constraint here is a distant one. Let us assume that a case came up with no
bargain, no duty, but a promise to parties jointly. The perceptron, if the weight at joint is very
much larger than the other weights, discovers a contract in this case too. The new case, call it
'case 'X', is a sixth row in Figure 5, which, if the law ought not enforce gratuitous promises,
reads '0, 0, 1, 0'. The perceptron gets this case wrong.
Training
PEs 1 2
bias -8.6994 -9.5121
bargain 8.7032 9.9686
duty -3.3891 -3.3553
joint 8.0000 9.5000
But the six cases together remain linearly separable. Therefore one can retrain the perceptron
already trained on the data of Figure 5 to decide all successfully. The table shows two
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, a noncooperative game does constructive, a
perceptron evaluative duty. The game gives a general reason to
enforce gratuitous promises. The perceptron provides a criterion for
the substantiality of legal argument. Cardozo is still elect, in the lan-
guage of the Bloom epigraph. 10 3 But then God is Calvinist and elec-
tion an act of grace.
retrainings, starting from joint = 25. Basically, the weight for the joint PE falls and that for
the bargain PE rises until the latter exceeds the former.
103. See supra note 1.
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